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AK                  Armia Krajowa (Polish Home Army) 
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OUN               Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) 
UB                   Urzad Bezpieczenstwa (security police) 
UNDO            Ukrains’ke Natsional ’ne Demokratychne Ob’iednannia (Ukrainian National Democratic 
Alliance) 
UPA                Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (Ukrainian Insurgency Army) 
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“To Resolve the Ukrainian Question Once and For All”: 
The Ethnic Cleansing of Ukrainians in Poland, 1943-1947 
  
  
Timothy Snyder
[1] 
  
             
The end of the cold war has brought a new approach to the historical study of the early postwar 
period. So long as the cold war lasted, the actors of its histories were states: the superpowers in the first 
instance, and allies and satellites on the margins.  Earlier debates concerning the immediate postwar 
years have thus concerned the responsibility of the major powers for the origins of the cold war.  The 
revolutions of 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the Yugoslav conflicts since have 
returned attention to national questions.  From this perspective, the years immediately following the 
Second World War are important not only as the time when Europe's states were divided into two 
blocs, but also as the moment when several of Europe's nations were subjected to deportations.
[2]
  The 
mass forced deportations, as a result of the way in which they were carried out, and as a result of their 
place in state propaganda since, did much to consolidate Polish and West Ukrainian nationalism.  The 
approach in this report thus concerns not only the choices of states, but the fate of social groups as they 
became nations.   
  
            The shift of attention to the histories of nations raises problems of method.  If the aerie of 
geopolitics is too distant from events, the rough ground of each nation's historiography is too close.  
Territory and nationality are among the most powerful sources of bias, and the match of political and 
ethnic frontiers is such a defining event that people are apt to forget just how it was achieved.  In 
addition, ethnic cleansing always involves mutual claims, and creates the conditions for a convenient 
dispute in which each side can present itself as innocent defenders of legitimate interests, its opponents 
as savage nationalists, and the noise of the quarrel as support for these contentions.  An important 
example is the ethnic cleansing of Galicia and Volhynia in the 1940s.  It is indisputable that (aside and 
apart from the Holocaust and casualties of the Second World War) about 50,000-100,000 Poles and 
Ukrainians were murdered and about 1.5 million Ukrainians and Poles forced to leave their homes 
between 1943 and 1947.  It is incontestable that the territories now constituting western Ukraine were 
cleansed of their large Polish minority, and the territories now constituting southeastern Poland 
cleansed of their large Ukrainian minority.  Behind these general statements, however, stand two 
apparently contradictory accounts of what happened and why.   
  
Among several other approaches, I used my MIT-Mellon grant to ascertain both how these instances of 
forced migration are remembered, and how they in fact took place.  This involved interviews, the use of 
private and state archives, and the exploitation of published material available in Poland and Ukraine 
(see footnotes).  The private archives, both Polish and Ukrainian, were the result of efforts by NGOs 
within Poland, both before and after 1989.  Although the Eastern Archive and the Ukrainian Archive 
have distinct agendas, each of them has allowed for the memories of both Poles and Ukrainians to be 
preserved in a form that is now available to the individual researcher.  In this sense, the work of NGOs 
in Poland has allowed for the recreation of the history of a moment of massive forced migration: a 
history that often contrasts with and serves as a check upon one-sided accounts based upon more 
limited archival resources. 
  
            In other words, the work of NGOs is contributing to the emergence of a more balanced image of 
the ethnic cleansings of the 1940s.  To see the importance of this, it is sufficient to compare the peace 
between Poland and Ukraine to national conflict elsewhere in Eastern Europe.  It is also important to 
see that these ethnic cleansings are important within both national societies, Polish and Ukrainian, and 
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that in this sense the efforts of NGOs have indirectly served to prevent what might have been divisive 
conflicts between states or between majorities and minorities.  Today, both Ukrainians and Poles 
believe that their claim to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939 and 1945 was legitimate.  Both 
Ukrainians and Poles assert that the other side cooperated with organs of power of the Nazi and Soviet 
occupiers in Galicia and Volhynia during and after the Second World War.  Both Ukrainians and Poles 
believe that the other side's partisans killed their civilians.  Both Ukrainians and Poles believe that 
hundreds of thousands of their own were expelled or dispersed by an ethnically cleansing state after the 
war.  Although in practice these beliefs are often held to be mutually contradictory, since one 
accusation is usually met with another, logically speaking they are not.  Indeed, all of these beliefs, in 
various measures and with various qualifications, are true.    
  
            The first three sets of propositions are factual, and one of the tasks of this report will be to 
propose an empirical account of the ethnic cleansings perpetrated by Ukrainians upon Poles and by 
Poles upon Ukrainians in the 1940s.  It will mainly attend to the homogenizing policy of the Polish 
communist regime in 1944-1947, but it will begin from the premise that some understanding of the 
cleansing of Poles by Ukrainians in 1943-1944 and the Second World War in Galicia and Volhynia is 
necessary for an explanation (and an evaluation) of that Polish policy.  The final set of propositions, 
concerning legitimacy, is of an ethical nature, and its adjudication will depend upon the application of 
prior ethical beliefs to the facts.  Although this report will not be chiefly concerned with ethical 
debates, its presentation of the facts will bear upon all ethical conclusions, provided of course that the 
method of ethical reasoning accounts in some way for the facts.   
  
            As a matter of historical method, it is also useful to point out that varying concept of legitimacy 
and the conclusions about rightful rule in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia drawn therefrom stand behind 
varying Polish and Ukrainian selection and interpretation of events.  By "Eastern Galicia and 
Volhynia" I mean the interwar Polish wojewódstwa of Lwów, Stanislawów, and Tarnopol, and Wolyn, 
which (with the exception of the far west of Lwów wojewódstwo) were incorporated into Soviet 
Ukraine in 1945, and which now constitute the L’viv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil', Volhynia and Rivne 
oblasti of independent Ukraine.  For Poles today, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939 and 1945 were 
legitimate parts of a Polish state.  They were included in Poland by international treaty after the First 
World War, and had been governed legally by the Polish state for thirty years.  This political-legal idea 
of legitimacy is consistent with both ethnic and civic forms of nationalism: one can see the Ukrainian 
minority as demographic material to be ethnically assimilated, or as citizens of another nationality to be 
included within the polity.  For Ukrainians today, Eastern Galicia and Volhynia in 1939 and 1945 were 
territories subject to a legitimate Ukrainian claim.  This claim was based upon the simple ethnographic 
fact that Ukrainians outnumbered Poles in these lands two to one (about five million to just over two 
million) during the interwar period.
[3]
  This majoritarian-ethnographic idea of legitimacy also embraces 
both ethnic and civic forms of nationalism: one can see Volhynia and Eastern Galicia as Ukrainian 
because they are inhabited by the "Ukrainian nation," because a majority of the individuals living there 
would have preferred if asked to live in a Ukrainian state.
[4]
    
  
            This disagreement about legitimacy is present in Poles and Ukrainians in the 1940s, when it 
conditioned actions; as well as at the present time, when it conditions interpretations of past actions.  
For both political activists at the time and historians today, the idea of legitimate rule powerfully 
influences conclusions drawn about the reasonability of the aspirations of minorities and the justice of 
the policies of the state.  The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the partition of Poland by Germany and the 
Soviet Union (1939), the Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (1939-1941), the German 
occupation of Ukraine (1941-1943), and the second Soviet occupation (1944) activated Polish-
Ukrainian conflicts rooted in these differing notions of legitimacy, and thereby created deeper problems 
of interpretation for later scholars.  The Second World War in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia will be 
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treated in the next section, and will have consequences for the argument in general, but ten factors 
relating to the experience of the war and its later interpretation must be signaled here. 
  
            First, invasion and occupation seemed to open historical possibilities (for Ukrainians) or 
threaten the closing of historical eras (for Poles).  The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (1939) was the height 
of treason for Poles, whereas for Ukrainians it was and is (among other things) the moment when 
western Ukraine joined a Ukrainian state organism.[5]  Likewise, the German invasion of 1941 seemed 
to offer Ukrainian nationalists grouped within the OUN (Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv, 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists) a chance to establish an independent Ukraine.  For Poles, this 
(failed) attempt to exploit the cover of German power to establish Ukrainian institutions smacked of 
panfascism.  Second, these opposing ideas of legitimate rule made it all the easier for both occupiers, 
and especially the Germans, to pursue a policy of divide and rule in areas of mixed Ukrainian and 
Polish settlement.  Third, occupations offered horrible temptations.  The first Soviet occupation (1939-
1941) decapitated Polish society by deporting Polish elites to Siberia and Kazakhstan.  This left Polish 
society a more tempting target for Ukrainian nationalists (1943).  The German occupation of Eastern 
Galicia and Volhynia (1941-1944) offered Ukrainians a chance to persecute Poles as officers of the 
state (1941-1942), and then later Poles a chance to do the reverse (1943-1944).  Fourth, occupations set 
precedents for (and offered training in) attacks on civilians for reasons of national identity.  The 
German occupation in particular was genocidal, and the Holocaust of the Jews set a precedent for the 
elimination of an entire nation.  Fifth, collaboration was rendered all but inevitable by the factors 
already mentioned (historical possibility, divide and rule, political temptation), as well as by the 
overwhelming power of the occupiers and by local conditions, which required the protection of 
communities against partisans.  However, it was still perceived by both sides as intolerable and 
inexplicable when pursued by the other group, though natural and forgivable when pursued by one's 
own.  Evaluations (then and now) of what is unforgivable collaboration and what is necessary 
compromise, of what is aggression and what is self-defense, depend upon one's own point of view and 
one's idea of legitimacy. 
  
            Over the course of the war, new actors emerged and spread modified versions of Polish and 
Ukrainian ideas of legitimate rule in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.  This is the sixth factor: the 
legitimate bearers of authority on both sides were no longer political institutions such as parties or 
governments but partisan armies.  In interwar Poland, the Ukrainian nationalist OUN was a far smaller 
party than the moderate UNDO (Ukrains’ke Natsional ’ne Demokratychne Ob’iednannia, Ukrainian 
National Democratic Alliance); when Poland was partitioned in 1939 the UNDO's policy of 
compromise lost its interlocutor and the party was quickly muscled aside by the OUN.   In 1943 the 
OUN-Bandera formed the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia, Ukrainian 
Insurgency Army, known as the UPA).  In Eastern Galicia and Volhynia during the war, the Polish 
government (in exile in London) was represented in practice by its Home Army (Armia Krajowa, or 
Home Army, known as the AK).  Seventh, the fog of war denied Poles and Ukrainians who might have 
inclined to do so the time to understand each other's positions, and provided Poles and Ukrainians 
willing to escalate conflict with plenty of pretexts and opportunities.  In particular, war made it much 
easier to conflate the actions of particular groups with the intentions of entire nations.  Eighth, and 
related to the previous two (armed groups, fog of war), ethnic ideas of national identity were supported 
by conditions in which behavior of individuals was evaluated in terms of loyalty or treason.
[6]
  The 
OUN was committed to ethnic homogeneity by its own program, but its program gained supporters and 
coherence in times of war.[7]  It would be too much to say that its policy of eliminating the Polish 
presence in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia (1943-44) enjoyed general support, but without wide support 
from local Ukrainians it would have been impossible.  Ninth, the enormous suffering of war and 
occupation seemed to further justify (for western Ukrainians) or further delegitimate (for eastern Poles) 
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the westward shift of the Polish state border in the wake of the Red Army's advance through Ukraine 
and Poland (1944-1945).  Tenth, for west Ukrainians and especially for Poles, the experience of total 
war delineated clearly who was the enemy and who was not, and this clarity was used by communist 
regimes as the implemented policies of ethnic cleansing.  Thus the new Polish communist regime's war 
against its Ukrainians could be fought by soldiers from Volhynia (1945-1946), and its policy of 
eliminating the Ukrainian presence in Poland (1947) could enjoy popular support. 
  
            These ten factors are not sufficient conditions for the events that are used as their illustrations, 
and this list is not meant as a summary of these events.  Rather, the presentation of opposing ideas of 
legitimate rule and the ten ways they were exacerbated by war is meant to serve both an explanatory 
and a methodological purpose.  In the narrative description of events that follows, they should cast 
some light on what might otherwise seem to be the obscure motivations of ethnic cleansers.  At the 
same time, they should offer clues as to how (not) to interpret Ukrainian and Polish sources and 
memories.  National historiographies and personal recollections offer the starting points, the 
opportunities for comparison and revision, and the foundation for a description of the ethnic cleansing 
as a crucial episode in postwar European history.  At the same time, an adequate historical account of 
ethnic cleansing would, in its turn, serve as a basis for comparison with national memories of the 
events in question.  This report relies upon such materials, and aims to provide such an account.  The 
cleansing of Ukrainians from southeastern Poland in 1944-47 is its major concern, but in order to create 
the appropriate context it begins with the cleansing of Poles from western Ukraine in 1943. 
  
  
One: Ukrainian Partisans Murder Polish Civilians (1943-1944) 
  
            The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, as amended in September 1939, brought 85% of Ukrainians 
from pre-war Poland under Soviet rule.  Although Soviet power was not generally desired in and of 
itself, for west Ukrainians the major results of the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet 
Union were the unification of Ukrainians lands within one state organism and the end of the Polish 
state.  For patriotic Ukrainians, this signified the end of centuries of subordination to Polish power: be 
it the First Republic against which Khmel’nyts’kyi rebelled in the seventeenth century, the Polish 
aristocracy that kept political power in Eastern Galicia (under Austrian rule) and economic power in 
Volhynia (under Russian rule) in the nineteenth century, or the interwar Second Republic which denied 
the national aspirations of its Ukrainian minority.[8]  Brutal as it was, the Soviet occupation of Eastern 
Galicia and Volhynia (1939-1941) seemed at first to offer opportunities to Ukrainian nationalism.  The 
Soviets sent about 200,000 Poles to Siberia, and encouraged revenge against Polish landholders and 
state officials.  Between 1939-1941 tens of thousands of Poles actually fled Soviet West Ukraine for 
the Nazi General-Government.
[9]
  From the point of view of west Ukrainian nationalists, with their 
program of Ukraine for the Ukrainians, this was a positive step. 
  
            Then Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union (1941), seemed to present 
Ukrainian nationalists with a far greater opportunity.  The OUN had been founded in 1929 with the 
goal of forming an independent Ukraine from Polish, Soviet, Romanian, and Czechoslovak territories: 
in such an endeavor Germany was the only plausible ally.  As the Germans quickly occupied Ukraine 
in summer 1941, the OUN-Bandera sought to use the umbrella of German power to create the 
institutions of autonomous statehood.  Although the Germans would use Ukrainians as soldiers, 
policemen, bureaucrats, and finally SS troops, this aspiration to independent action was intolerable and 
rapidly suppressed.  Ukrainian nationalists were also disappointed by the German decision to split 
Ukrainian lands between the General Government and the Reichskommisariat Ukraine, and by the 
German choice to exploit Ukraine for its resources and Ukrainians as forced labor.  Treating the 
Germans as occupier rather than ally was a difficult process for the OUN, but from about mid-1942 it is 
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proper to characterize the OUN as anti-German (although the Germans were never its most important 
enemy).
[10]
  In early 1943, just as the tide of war was turning against the Germans at Stalingrad, the 
strongest movement of Ukrainian nationalists, the OUN-Bandera, united and strengthened partisan 
groups, henceforth called the UPA, to defend the country from every occupier: Polish, Soviet, and 
German. 
  
            Why did the UPA choose to direct its attacks upon Poles in 1943?  Why, in other words, did the 
national goal of winning independence from powerful occupiers appear to Ukrainian nationalists as an 
ethnic problem concerning Poles?  Even as German and Soviet armies battled each other in Russia, 
west Ukrainians remembered that Poles and Ukrainians were the historical claimants to Volhynia and 
Eastern Galicia.  Most UPA soldiers and nearly all of its leaders were west Ukrainians.  Some were 
veterans of organized terrorist attacks against Polish colonizers and landholders in the east; a few had 
taken part in assassination attempts on Polish officials.[11]  While the UPA (and west Ukrainians 
generally) now regarded the interwar Polish state as defunct, Poles in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia 
took a completely different view.   Poles wished to restore their state, and did not believe that German 
or Soviet aggression justified a change in its eastern frontiers.[12]  UPA leaders apparently believed that 
the Second World War would end with the exhaustion of both Germany and Russia, and that Ukraine's 
final enemy would be a resurrected Poland unwilling to abandon its eastern lands.  On this view, 
Ukrainians had to strike during the war, before a revived Poland could direct forces and settlers from 
central Poland.[13]   The temptation for such a preemptive action was heightened by expectations of a 
Polish offensive. 
  
            As Ukrainians knew or suspected, the Polish government-in-exile and underground considered 
this chain of events most likely and planned just such an offensive.
[14]
  From a Polish point of view, 
the defeat of both Germany and Russia would open the field in the east.  As early as 1941, it was 
understood that a future rising against German power would involve a war against Ukrainians for 
Eastern Galicia and probably Volhynia as well, to be prosecuted if possible as a quick "armed 
occupation."
[15]
   The AK's plans for a rising, as formulated in 1942, anticipated a war with Ukrainians 
for the ethnographically Ukrainian territories that fell within Poland's prewar boundaries.[16]     By 1942 
the formation of sizable Polish partisan units in the east could not but remind Ukrainians of Polish 
territorial claims.   
  
            Ukrainian cooperation with Nazi Germany had discredited Ukrainian partisans as potential 
allies to Poles;
[17]
 and as defenders of the pre-war frontiers of Poland, AK leaders had nothing to offer 
Ukrainians.[18]   The government-in-exile and the AK prosecuted the war in order to restore the Polish 
Republic, an aim taken for granted by Polish soldiers and supported by promises from the other 
Western allies.  Cooler heads in London discussed ways to cooperate with Ukrainians.  However, even 
at its most generous, in spring 1943, the Polish government-in-exile could offer no more than 
autonomy within prewar borders.[19]   The advent of the UPA and its attacks on Polish civilians (1943-
1944) killed any spirit of compromise on the Polish side: although it should be said that the main 
reaction in London was of confusion and frustration, and the first reaction of the AK was to attempt to 
cooperate with Ukrainian nationalists to prevent anarchy.[20]  The crucial matter, though, is the basic 
disagreement between Ukrainians and Poles over the legitimate rule of particular territories, sharpened 
by Poles' uncompromising belief in their continuing right to lands populated by Ukrainians, and fear of 
making concessions in time of war. 
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            Why Polish civilians?  Why did the UPA's strategic problem, conceived in ethnic terms, 
occasion mass murder?[21]   Unlike the German and Russian enemies, the Polish enemy was 
represented by very large numbers of civilians: dominating Lwów and other cities (the Jews were most 
highly represented in small towns), more than a third of the population of Eastern Galicia, less frequent 
in Volhynia and in villages, but present everywhere.  In the lands of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia 
under Polish rule, Poles totaled something over two million in 1939, down to perhaps 1.6 million in 
1943.
[22]
  In the minds of many patriotic West Ukrainians, this Polish presence was an illegitimate 
occupation, symbolized most powerfully by the colonies (this was the official term) of Polish settlers 
established in the 1920s and 1930s.  The OUN (and thus the UPA) accepted a totalistic form of integral 
nationalism, according to which Ukrainian freedom required ethnic homogeneity.  The Polish enemy 
could therefore only be defeated by the removal of Poles from Ukrainians lands.
[23]
  Soviets and 
Germans had begun the task, the Soviets by deporting Poles between 1939 and 1941, the Germans by 
providing examples of and training in genocide since.  Many of the UPA's soldiers were former 
Wehrmacht soldiers, policemen, or Waffen-SS troops; and more generally the example of German 
nationality policy must have demoralized the Ukrainian population (as it did civilian populations 
elsewhere, for example in Poland.)   
  
            One way to mark the beginning of large-scale UPA operations is the defection of 5,000 
Ukrainian policemen, who took their weapons to Volhynian forests in March 1943.  Having left 
German service, Ukrainian partisans threatened to liquidate Polish villages if Poles took their place,
[24]
  
and eliminated entire villages in April 1943 on grounds of Polish collaboration.
[25]
  (This forced Poles 
to form self-defense units, and thus to ask the Germans for arms, which to Ukrainians looked like 
collaboration, and so prompted further attacks.)  Ukrainian nationalist collaboration continued in some 
forms.  While Ukrainian nationalists in Volhynia were threatening Poles with death for collaboration, 
in May 1943 Ukrainian nationalists in Eastern Galicia were joining (despite official OUN-Bandera 
opposition) the new Waffen-SS Division "Galizien."  The hypocrisy of all this does not exclude its 
sincerity.  Ukrainian nationalists saw their own cooperation with the Nazis as a justified means to the 
legitimate end of creating a Ukrainian state, but perceived Polish cooperation with occupiers as simple 
perfidy.[26]  This double standard derived from a basic sense of entitlement to Eastern Galicia and 
Volhynia, and a complete denial of the Poles' rights in these lands.  In other words, it was rooted in the 
same basic disagreement about legitimate rule over territory, sharpened perhaps by the demoralizing 
effects of occupation, probably by the German policy of divide and rule, and certainly by the OUN's 
integral nationalism. 
  
            By February 1943 the OUN appears to have initiated a policy of murdering Polish civilians as a 
means of resolving the Polish question in Ukraine.  The attacks began in Volhynia, where the Polish 
presence was weakest.  It is as yet unproven, but certainly plausible, that the murderous violence 
unleashed against Poles was meant to be general.
[27]
  It is clear that from its beginnings in March 1943, 
the policy of liquidating Poles proved popular within the UPA, and found support among (often land-
starved) Ukrainian peasants in Volhynia.
[28]
  Ukrainians in ethnically mixed villages and towns were 
offered material inducements to join in the slaughter of their neighbors—although Polish recollections 
prove that a large number of Ukrainians risked (and sometimes lost) their own lives by warning or 
sheltering Poles instead.
[29]
  UPA partisans and Ukrainian peasants nevertheless killed 40,000 Polish 
civilians in Volhynia in spring and summer 1943.[30]   On a single day, 11 July 1943, the UPA attacked 
167 localities and killed about 10,000 Poles.  Ukrainian partisans burned homes, shot or forced back 
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inside those who tried to flee, and used sickles and pitchforks to kill those they captured outside.  In 
some cases, beheaded, crucified, dismembered, or disemboweled bodies were displayed, in order to 
encourage remaining Poles to flee.[31]   
  
            Thousands of Polish men and women escaped to Volhynian marshes and forests in 1943, 
joining Soviet partisan armies fighting the UPA and the Wehrmacht.[32]  On the other hand, some Poles 
took their revenge on Ukrainians as German policemen.  The majority of Poles who survived simply 
fled west, bringing news of the slaughter to Chelm, L'viv, and Przemysl.  For the Polish government-
in-exile in London, the tragedy was both incomprehensible and a distraction from its own war 
planning.  (Although local Polish units would take matters into their own hands, there is no evidence 
that the Polish government contemplated a policy of general revenge against Ukrainian civilians.) 
 Polish partisans of all political stripes attacked the UPA, assassinated prominent Ukrainian civilians, 
and burned Ukrainian villages.[33]  UPA attacks on civilians in winter 1943-44 were frustrated by 
Polish self-defense.  By this time, the AK had initiated a national armed rising known as Operation 
"Burza," which was understood locally as an attempt to reconfirm the Polish presence in Volhynia and 
Eastern Galicia.  In January 1944 the AK formed the 27th Infantry Division of Volhynia, 6,558 strong, 
tasked to engage the UPA and then the Wehrmacht.  That spring, the division fought its way through 
German lines and UPA attacks to join the Red Army, only to be dissolved for its pains by the Soviets.
[34]   
  
            Throughout spring 1944, the AK and UPA fought fitful engagements for Eastern Galicia, and 
its crown jewel L’viv.  The UPA attacked Polish civilians, but Polish preparations and Ukrainian 
warnings limited the deaths to perhaps 5,000-10,000.[35]  In July 1944, the Red Army (aided by the 
AK) drove the Germans from L’viv.  AK units were then dissolved under pressure from the Narodnyi 
Kommissariat Vnuntrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for International Affairs, NKVD) and Red 
Army.  Ukrainian partisans had already escaped to the mountains, where they would begin a desperate 
struggle against Soviet rule.
[36]
  From mid-1944, the main enemy of the OUN and the UPA was not the 
Poles but the Soviets.  The Soviet occupation of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia in July 1944 places the 
ethnic cleansings and the Ukrainian-Polish war in depressing perspective.  The AK was wrong to think 
that Operation "Burza" could save L’viv for Poland; the UPA was wrong to think that Polish civilians 
stood in the way of L'viv's incorporation into Ukraine.  To be sure, an extended Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic was not what the UPA had in mind, but Stalin’s plans did moot the Polish-Ukrainian 
struggle for territory.
[37] 
  
  
Two: Soviet and Polish Communist Regimes Deport Poles and Ukrainians (1944-1946) 
  
            The Soviet-sponsored "Polish Committee of National Liberation" was installed in Lublin that 
same month, July 1944.  As Ukrainian and Polish partisans fought desperately and separately to 
preserve influence over territory, Stalin and his chosen Poles moved quickly to alter political and 
demographic frontiers.  Their idea, the exchange of Polish and Ukrainian populations, was not a new 
one.  Stalin had of course been deporting huge populations within the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 
during the war.[38]   However, there was a Polish tradition as well.  Even before the mass killings of 
Poles by Ukrainians in 1943, indeed even before the war, Polish nationalists in the tradition of Roman 
Dmowski's National Democrats (Endecja) had dreamed of expelling every Ukrainian from Poland.[39]  
After July 1943, some political thinkers of other orientations also concluded that expulsions were the 
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only alternative to granting the Ukrainians all the territory east of the San and Bug rivers.  This would 
have meant expelling about five million Ukrainians east of Poland's pre-war borders, beyond the 
Zbruch river, and taking ethnic Poles in return from the Soviet Union or an independent Ukraine.[40]  
In some versions of this idea, Ukrainians who managed to escape deportation could be dispersed 
throughout the country.
[41]
  As early as 1943-44, Polish communists eerily dropped language about the 
rights of minorities from their programmatic documents.[42]  
  
            The removal of Ukrainians was one of several examples of Polish communism's appropriation 
of Polish ethnic nationalism and wartime suffering—as well as its betrayal of more tolerant traditions 
of the Polish left given voice even in the worst hours of the war.   However, in summer 1944 it was 
Stalin's preferences, rather than Polish traditions of any kind, that counted.  The population exchanges 
were preceded by, and based upon, a Soviet-Polish border accord that no Polish nationalist (and few 
Polish communists) found acceptable.  A secret agreement of 27 July 1944 shifted the Soviet border to 
the east (once again, as in 1939) thereby removing 85% of Ukrainians from Poland, leaving only about 
700,000.  Most of interwar Poland's prewar Ukrainian minority thus left Poland without physically 
moving at all.[43]     
  
            Within the borders envisioned by the Soviet-Polish agreement, Ukrainians constituted only 
about 3% of the Polish population.  The Soviet policy, articulated a few weeks later, was their 
removal.  The agreement on "evacuation" signed on 9 September 1944 by Nikita Khrushchev, as 
People's Commissar for Ukraine, and Edward Osóbka-Morawski, head of the "Polish Committee of 
National Liberation" installed in Lublin, was part of a general Stalinist (and Allied) policy of the 
relocation of peoples.  It mandated that Poland evacuate "all citizens" of Ukrainian background who 
wished to resettle in Soviet Ukraine, and that Soviet Ukraine do the same for Poles and Jews.
[44]
   The 
fiercest Polish advocates of the total expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland to the Soviet Union, Poles in 
Eastern Galicia, now found themselves in the Soviet Union, among the perhaps 1.3 million Poles left in 
the enlarged Soviet Ukraine.  Most of them left the USSR for Poland within its new borders, thereby 
effectively ending hundreds of years of Polish settlement in western Ukraine.
[45]
  Roughly 250,000 had 
already fled Volhynia to escape the UPA, and about 788,000 preferred "repatriation" to life in a 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[46]  In general they were not forcibly deported, but they were effectively 
coerced by the prospect of Stalinist rule and the memory of Ukrainian nationalism. 
  
            The Soviet-Polish "evacuations" faced greater problems on the Polish side of the new border.  
Ukrainians were less willing to leave their ancestral lands in southeastern Poland (or, from the 
Ukrainian point of view, the "territory beyond the Curzon line," or “Zakerzons'kyi krai”).  True, 
villages of Lemkos (some of them russophiles who identified with Great Russian rather than with 
Ukrainian or Ruthenian nationality) chose resettlement in early 1945.
[47]
   However, generally 
speaking, only those Ukrainians who departed during the first few months of the operation, in late 
1944, truly did so of their own volition.  In early 1945, the Polish state began to exert pressure.  
Ukrainians were denied the right to land, and saw their schools closed.[48]  Orders went out to arrest all 
young men who had not registered for repatriation.
[49]
  Most decisively, the Polish regime's internal 
security forces and new army began to attack Ukrainian villages, killing civilians in a new round of 
atrocities.
[50]
   UPA forces and spontaneous Ukrainian self-defense groups replied by destroying Polish 
communities.[51]   
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            Afterwards, Polish communist propaganda tended to conflate the cleansing of Volhynia in 1943 
with the battles in southeastern Poland of 1945, so as not to remind Poles of eastern lands lost to the 
Soviet Union.[52]  The differences are important.  Volhynia in 1943 was the center of UPA operations.  
In 1945 in Poland, UPA units probably never numbered more than 2,000 troops (along with perhaps 
3,000 OUN members).
[53]
  True, Ukrainians were a demographic majority in many areas of the border 
strip running from Chelm almost to Kraków, and UPA soldiers were at first better organized than the 
Polish soldiers they confronted.  True, the UPA did continue to kill Polish civilians and destroy Polish 
property.  However, this was now usually part of a more or less proportional response to attacks by 
Poles: Polish soldiers, Polish security forces, Polish right-wing nationalist partisans (groups that had 
remained outside the AK command), or Polish security forces dressed as partisans, or indeed Polish 
partisans disguised as soldiers.  In Poland in 1945, it is likely that more Ukrainians were killed by Poles 
than Poles were killed by Ukrainians.  In both cases a rough estimate would be in the low thousands.  
The crucial difference between 1943 and 1945 was that of state power.  In May 1945 the Polish state 
founded its internal security troops (Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego), and by July had begun to 
control its borders (recognized by the Allies at Yalta that month).  In Volhynia in 1943, Ukrainians and 
Poles had used (weakening) German authorities against each other: in southeastern Poland in 1945 the 
(strengthening) state was, if not exactly on the side of the ethnic Poles, certainly set decisively against 
the ethnic Ukrainians.   
  
            In spring 1945, the inexorable shift of power forced Ukrainians to leave.  When Polish soldiers 
burned their villages, many Ukrainians saw no recourse but to accept "repatriation."  Continued attacks 
by nationalist partisans had the same effect.  In one particularly horrific case, Polish nationalist 
partisans (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne) posed as soldiers returning from the German front to enter the 
village of Wierzchowiny, then killed 197 civilians.[54]    A local official charged with organizing the 
expulsions from the Przemysl area complained that Ukrainians fleeing Polish attacks were 
overwhelming his office.  "There are cases," he wrote, "of Ukrainian populations abandoning whole 
villages, escaping as they are, and reporting en masse to the Soviet plenipotentiary, demanding 
immediate evacuation."[55]   Although this extreme intimidation was less direct than means that would 
be pursued in the months to come, it clearly affected the calculations of many of the 208,000 
Ukrainians who left Poland during the first eight months of 1945. 
  
            From the beginning, Ukrainian partisans of the OUN and UPA had urged Ukrainians to remain 
at home, regarding the "Zakerzons'kyi krai" as part of western Ukraine, and "repatriation" as a device 
to exterminate Ukrainians in Soviet camps and thereby destroy the Ukrainian nation.[56]  UPA soldiers 
set to work blowing up train tracks and locomotives, destroying bridges, assassinating officials charged 
with "repatriation," and setting traps for Polish Army units tasked to assist.
[57]
  They also fatefully 
decided to burn depopulated Ukrainian villages, to prevent them from being resettled by Poles.  This 
created a sense of general chaos and desperation that Polish communists exploited.
[58]
   
  
            During the first half of 1945, Ukrainians and Poles in southeastern Poland still had some margin 
of maneuver.  The consolidation of communist rule encouraged the UPA to cooperate with the anti -
communist descendants of the AK (dissolved in January 1945), Polish partisans known from 
September 1945 as Wolnosc i Niezawislosc (Freedom and Independence, or AK-WiN).  The UPA and 
Polish partisans reached a truce in spring 1945, which reduced attacks on civilians.[59]   Also by spring 
1945, "repatriated" Ukrainians were returning to Poland (often by claiming to be ethnic Poles and thus 
re-"repatriating"), bringing with them horrifying accounts of Soviet Ukraine.  Ukrainian civilians now 
organized for the right to remain.  In July 1945, a delegation of Ukrainians defended their constitutional 
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rights in Warsaw at a meeting at the Ministry of Public Administration.  A sample of the replies they 
received suggested that worse was to come.  "Although the Citizens are unanimous in wishing to 
remain here, I think that this will be impossible," said the delegate from the Council of Ministers.  
"After the understanding reached with the Soviet Union to establish an ethnographic frontier, we have a 
tendency to be a national state (panstwo narodowe), and not a state of nationalities (panstwo 
narodowosciowe). We do not want to do anyone harm, but we do wish to remove the problem of 
national minorities."  As the west Ukrainian communist Mykola Korolko concluded (as, incongruously, 
a representative of Lublin), "If Poland is to be a national state, there is no alternative to resettling 
Ukrainians to Ukraine."
[60]
   
  
            In late summer 1945, Polish authorities officially renounced the legal fiction of the "voluntary" 
character of "repatriation."  After the Soviet plenipotentiary for repatriation affairs requested the use of 
force, on 3 September 1945 Polish authorities ordered three infantry divisions to forcibly resettle 
remaining Ukrainians to the Soviet Union.[61]  These forces were already in the area, tasked since May 
1945 to destroy the UPA.
[62]
  They had enjoyed no great success in military operations, but their use 
against civilians proved effective—and brutal.  The ranks of two of the three divisions were filled by 
ethnic Poles from Volhynia, some of whom now exploited their positions as soldiers of the state to 
extract personal revenge.  Polish soldiers killed hundreds of Ukrainian civilians as they forced about 
23,000 to evacuate the country in late 1945. 
  
            Just as the Polish state was harnessing the desire of some of its ethnically Polish citizens for 
revenge against the UPA, its policies were driving its ethnically Ukrainian citizens into the UPA's 
arms.  At this point, the UPA accepted the mantle of defender of Ukrainians' right to remain in Poland.  
However, despite increasing public support, its overall position was very grim.  The UPA in Poland 
could resist direct attacks for only a limited time, and public support meant little if the Polish state 
could disassemble the public.  In this mood, troops were ordered to execute stoically their final duty to 
their homeland.[63]   The UPA pressed on, preparing comprehensive resistance to expulsions.  Measures 
ranged now from agitation of Polish soldiers to assassination of Polish "repatriation" committees to the 
burning of abandoned villages, but excluded (in principle) attacks on Polish civilians.   
  
            In April 1946 Polish authorities organized the three infantry divisions already engaged and 
other army formations, border troops, and security forces into Operational Group "Rzeszów," tasked to 
complete the expulsion of Ukrainians from Poland.  Villages that had earlier resisted expulsion were 
now violently pacified.  Hurried to make a quota, the operational subgroups moved from village to 
village, forcing inhabitants into convoys bound for Soviet Ukraine; 252,000 more Ukrainians were 
deported between April and June 1946.  During the entire period of "repatriations," between October 
1944 and June 1946, 482,000 Ukrainians departed for the Soviet Union.  In rough terms, 300,000 were 
forced to do so, 100,000 were effectively coerced by nearby violence or homelessness, and the rest 
chose to leave. 
  
  
Three: The Polish Communist Regime Disperses Ukrainians: Plans (1947) 
  
            After Operation "Rzeszów," in late 1946, the Polish politburo and general staff thought that the 
Ukrainian problem had been resolved.  By early 1947, the Polish general staff recognized that more 
Ukrainians had escaped deportation than they had expected, and asked the politburo for authorization 
to eliminate the "remnants."
[64]
  Since the Soviet Union was no longer interested in population 
exchanges, Deputy Chief of Staff General Stefan Mossor recommended "resettling these people by 
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individual family in dispersion throughout the entire area of the Recovered Territories" of northern and 
western Poland.
[65]
  Proposals along these lines were considered by the politburo in March 1947.  After 
Deputy Defense Minister Karol Swierczewski was assassinated on 28 March (probably by the UPA), 
the politburo decided at once to "resettle Ukrainians and mixed families in the regained territories 
(especially in southern Prussia), not forming any tight groups and no closer than 100 kilometers to the 
border."[66]   Swierczewski's death was probably a pretext.  Even though military and intelligence 
reports detailed the decay of the UPA, and confirmed that UPA was no longer attacking Polish units, in 
late March the politburo began a propaganda campaign treating Ukrainian partisans as Nazi units, 
whose threat to the security of the state justified extraordinary measures.   
  
            There is no reason to doubt that the Polish plan had Soviet approval.  In an unusually quick 
reaction, Lieutenant Colonel Waclaw Kossowski, a Red Army officer and Soviet plant in the Polish 
general staff, was sent to investigate Swierczewski's assassination on the very day it happened, 28 
March.  Kossowski concluded that the identity of the assailants was impossible to determine, but 
nevertheless provided a rather definitive policy recommendation on 11 April:  "As soon as possible, an 
Operational Group should be organized, which would elaborate a plan to include among other matters 
the complete extermination of the remnants of the Ukrainian population in the southeastern border 
region of Poland."
[67]
  The very next day, 12 April, the State Security Commission (Panstwowa 
Komisja Bezpieczenstwa), the central organ charged with eliminating organized resistance to the 
communist regime, initiated just such a policy.[68]  It approved a laconic report delivered by Stanislaw 
Radkiewicz, minister for public security.  Radkiewicz was an interwar Polish communist who had 
spent the war in the Soviet Union and fought in the Red Army.  He was charged with internal security 
the moment the Red Army crossed into Poland, and remained head of the secret police through 1954.  
Also present was Defense Minister and Marshall Michal Rola-Zymierski, another dependent of Stalin.  
Zymierski had served in Pilsudski's Legions and earned the rank of general in the interwar period, but 
had been dismissed on a corruption charge.  He joined the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army during the 
war, and owed his advance to its head to Stalin.  He had led the Polish divisions originally tasked to 
engage the UPA in May 1945.   
  
            Polish military planners thought that the "remnants of the Ukrainian population" amounted to 
74,000 Ukrainians; in fact there were still some 200,000 Ukrainians in Poland (about 0.8% of the 
Polish population).
[69]
  The absolute numbers are high enough to suggest the scale of suffering that 
forced relocation would bring; the relative numbers are low enough to call into question the idea that 
Ukrainians, no matter what they did, could threaten the Polish state.  It is true that many of these Polish 
citizens of Ukrainian nationality supported the UPA, and that this support became widespread as 
Ukrainians were deported from their ancestral lands in 1945 and 1946.  It is also true that the main goal 
of the UPA was to establish an independent Ukrainian state, and that its soldiers were willing to fight 
on against overwhelming odds to resist Polish communist power.  Although OUN and UPA leaders 
now concealed their final goals and limited their attacks on Polish troops, there can be no doubt about 
the basic conflict of interest between the UPA and the Polish state rooted in opposing ideas about 
legitimate rule of territory. 
  
            Yet the idea of "complete extermination" cannot be understood simply as an attack on the UPA, 
or even on its civilian base as such.  Resettlement was considered a good in its own right, above and 
apart from the destruction of the UPA.   One of the army's two main operational tasks, as defined by the 
formal order of the State Security Commission, was to "destroy the UPA bands."  The second task was 
to carry out "an evacuation of all persons of Ukrainian nationality from the region to the northwestern 
territories, resettling them with the widest possible dispersion."[70]    Defenders of what was christened 
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Operation "Wisla" sometimes contend that the second was merely a means to the first, that the 
dispersion of the entire Ukrainian population was simply a part of military operations against the UPA, 
indeed a necessary part.[71]  This is not how Polish commanders (including those reporting to Moscow) 
understood the Operation.  Resettlement was to continue to the last Ukrainian even if the UPA was 
quickly neutralized.  Resettlement was designed to ensure that Ukrainian communities could never 
arise again in Poland.  
  
            Operation "Wisla" was a policy of ethnic "cleansing" (the word appears again and again) 
designed to redraw the ethnic geography of the new Polish state.  Polish authorities decided to resettle 
"every person of Ukrainian nationality."  Even communities that had not supported the UPA, even 
mixed families, even Lemkos returning from Red Army service, even loyal party members trained in 
the Soviet Union, even communists who had helped "repatriate" Ukrainians in the previous wave, were 
forcibly resettled—although it must be said that communist dignitaries were helped to transport their 
property.[72]   Nationality, here as during the "repatriations," was decided not by individual choice but 
by blood, religion, and most frequently by the letter "U" in the Kennkarte Polish citizens received from 
the Nazi occupation regime during the war.[73]   
  
            The Polish communist regime stood to gain in popularity by identifying itself with the Polish 
nation, by combating "Ukrainian nationality."  The attempt at hegemony over the idea of the nation had 
been the major goal of communist propaganda from 1943; the genius of excluding the UPA from the 
national amnesty of February 1947, of prosecuting Ukrainian partisans under different laws than Polish 
ones, and finally of Operation "Wisla" in summer 1947, was that such actions defined that national 
community starkly and plainly.  The totalizing aspirations of the policy (to be applied to "every 
person") confirm that Polish leaders desired a clean break with the multinational past, that the "national 
state" was the endpoint of the proletarian revolution.  The initial plan for Operation "Wisla," drafted by 
Mossor and presented to the Polish politburo by Minister of Defense Zymierski and Minister of Public 
Security Radkiewicz on 16 April 1947, began with the words: "To resolve the Ukrainian question in 
Poland once and for all."[74]    
  
  
Four: The Polish Communist Regime Disperses Ukrainians: Practice (1947) 
  
            Leadership of Operation "Wisla" was entrusted to General Stefan Mossor, who joined the 
communist party only in 1945.  Mossor had been a soldier in Pilsudski's legions, a military planner in 
interwar Poland (he correctly foresaw defeat in two weeks if the Germans attacked in 1939), and a 
German prisoner of war (arrested after 11 days of battle).  He had joined the Soviet-sponsored Polish 
Army in 1945, and by the end of the year had risen from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general.  In 
early 1947, Mossor had pushed for dispersion of Ukrainians in reports from the field in southeastern 
Poland.  (His bluff confidence must have hidden a good deal of fear: he had in 1941 written that Soviet 
defeat in the Second World War was inevitable, and in 1943 led the Polish officers within the Red 
Cross commission that investigated Katyn at the invitation of Germany.)[75]  The military operations 
against the UPA, and the army's role in resettlement, were apparently planned by two Soviet Poles:
[76]
 
Colonel Michal Chilinski, chief of staff of the operation, and Lieutenant Colonel Waclaw Kossowski, 
the Red Army officer who had reported on the Swierczewski assassination, now detailed to head the 
staff's operations section.
[77]
  "Wisla" joined five infantry divisions with some security forces (of the 
Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego) into a force of about 17,940 men.   
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            Mossor, Kossowski, and Chilinski were concerned in the first instance with the destruction of 
the UPA.   When operations began in late April in the Rzeszów area, Mossor was most unimpressed by 
the performance of his soldiers in battle: "all unit leaders seem to be hypnotized by the evacuation 
action, and have forgotten the first and main task, which is the struggle with UPA bands."[78]  
However, as Mossor, Kossowski, and Chilinski came to understand, although the UPA remained 
difficult to destroy in direct combat, resettlement meant that its days were numbered.[79]  As calls to 
die for history's sake and desperate dreams of Anglo-American air support took the place of clear plans 
and informed courage in UPA reports, Kossowski and Chilinski calmly drew the operational lessons 
from Rzeszów and issued orders for the next round of attacks.[80]  Their communications were 
distinguished by quickly increasing knowledge, as well as a thorough familiarity with Soviet protocols 
of anti-partisan warfare.
[81]
  They carefully explained how to destroy the reinforced bunkers where 
UPA soldiers took shelter, how to use police dogs to trace retreating partisans through the forest, and 
the like.[82] 
  
            Meanwhile, the dispersion task proceeded smoothly, first in Rzeszów province, then in Lublin 
and Kraków provinces.  Between 28 April and 28 August 1947 Operational Group "Wisla" moved 
some 140,000 Ukrainians from southeastern to northwestern Poland.  "Wisla" perfected tactics used in 
"Rzeszów": first a settlement was enclosed and protected from UPA intervention, then a list of names 
of those to be resettled was read.  These people were given a few hours to pack, and relocated to 
intermediary sites.
[83]
  It also repeated "Rzeszów"'s abuses: needlessly pacified villages, brutal 
beatings, occasional killings.  It was distinguished from its predecessor by the more complicated role 
played by the security services.  At intermediary sites, as Ukrainians waited without shelter to board 
trains, the Urzad Bezpieczenstwa (security police, or UB) would select individuals for their particular 
attention, and pass a general judgment about the final destination of the group.  Ukrainians were packed 
into trains for Lublin or (most often) Oswiecim (Auschwitz), where they were rerouted to their new 
places of settlement.  The final destination and degree of dispersal of groups was determined by the 
judgment of the intelligence officers, whose colleagues were waiting to receive their instructions in 
sealed envelopes at the end of the line.
[84]
   
  
            Individuals singled out could be judicially murdered or sent to a concentration camp.  Military 
courts, empowered to judge civilians, sentenced at the very least 173 Ukrainians to death on the spot 
for collaborating with the UPA.[85]  Most of these sentences were carried out the same day.  
Altogether, 3,936 Ukrainians, including 823 women and children, were taken to the Jaworzno 
concentration camp, a wartime affiliate of the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex.  There, routine torture 
was accompanied by typhus epidemics and extreme shortages of food and clothing.[86]  Several 
Ukrainians died in Jaworzno, including two women by suicide.   
  
            The success of the resettlement mission prepared the way for the final military defeat of the 
UPA in Poland.  Soviet NKVD and Czechoslovak regular army troops had sealed the frontiers, leaving 
the Ukrainian partisans trapped in their confrontation with the Polish state.  From exaggerated Polish 
reports it is difficult to say how many UPA and OUN partisans were killed in the engagements of 1945-
1947: on the order of 1000-2000, compared to 3100 Polish soldiers and functionaries.  Some Ukrainian 
partisans fought their way across the sealed borders, some allowed themselves to be resettled in 
northwestern Poland.  The end of UPA activity in Poland is dated from 17 September 1947, when OUN 
commander Jaroslav Starukh perished in his bunker.[87]  UPA commander Miroslav Onyshkevich then 
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released his soldiers from their oaths.
[88]
  The Polish state had already criminalized the Uniate Church, 
and now set about redistributing the properties it took from resettled Ukrainians in the southeast.  So 
ended one thousand years of continuous Ukrainian settlement, and so—after the Holocaust of the Jews, 
after the expulsion of the Germans, and given the passivity of remaining Belarusians—the Polish 
"national state." 
  
  
Five: The Issue of Polish Responsibility (1939-1999) 
  
            It is hard to disagree with the Ukrainian author of a July 1943 UPA appeal to Poles.  "It is a 
strange and incomprehensible fact," he wrote, "that today, when the Polish nation groans under the 
yoke of the German aggressor, and when Russia too plans a new occupation of Poland, Poland's 
imperialist leaders once again declare war on the Ukrainian nation, denying it the right to its own 
independent existence."[89]   He was right that Poland, like west Ukraine, was occupied by an 
aggressive foreign power, Nazi Germany.  He was right that in Poland, as in west Ukraine, German 
power would be supplanted by an even more stubborn occupier, the Soviet Union.  And he was right 
that the attitudes of Poland's government-in-exile and especially its underground military leaders were 
imperialistic, at least in the precise sense that few of them understood that Ukrainians were a nation just 
as Poles were, deserving of the same right to independence. 
  
            However, the "fact" of Polish hostility to Ukrainians was not as "strange and incomprehensible" 
as this suggests.  At the very moment when this appeal was issued, its author's comrades in arms were 
carrying out one of the most terrible acts of the Second World War.  Precisely in July 1943, the UPA's 
fearsome campaign of comprehensive atrocity designed to end the Polish presence in Volhynia reached 
its zenith.  At the moment the author was guaranteeing their right to remain in a future free Ukraine as 
equal citizens under the law, terrified Poles were fleeing Volhynia in the hundreds of thousands.  The 
stories they brought west, and the humiliation they brought to the ranks of the AK, assured that Polish-
Ukrainian armed cooperation was all but impossible throughout the rest of the war.  The experience 
also guaranteed that there would be minimal sympathy for the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians 
who, one to three years later, would themselves be forced to leave their homes.  Operation "Wisla" was 
the single bloodiest action of the Polish communist regime, but this is not its first association in the 
minds of Poles.  To this day, Polish memory links Operation "Wisla" to the slaughter in Volhynia, and 
to this day Polish public opinion fears Ukraine more than any other neighbor.
[90] 
  
            The author of the 1943 UPA appeal began a Ukrainian tradition of asking for Polish sympathy 
without reference to the causes for its absence.  The main focus of Ukrainian attention on Operation 
"Wisla" has been the question of Polish responsibility.  It is clearly unsatisfactory for Ukrainians to 
draw attention to the dispersions of Ukrainians by the Polish state in 1947 without attending to the 
murder of Polish civilians by Ukrainian nationalists in 1943.  At the same time, it is mistaken to claim, 
as the main Polish defense asserts, that state policy in 1947 was a simple result of UPA actions in 
1943.   
  
            The preceding sections allow us to make four relevant distinctions.  In the first place, it is true 
that the Polish regime had more influence over the course of events in 1947, when Ukrainians were 
dispersed in Poland, than in 1945 and 1946, when they were expelled to the Soviet Union.  It was 
apparently the Polish regime, not the Soviet regime, that perceived the need for another resettlement.
[91]
  If Stalin had agreed that Ukrainians posed a grave threat to the security of his most important new 
satellite, he presumably would have agreed to take them into Soviet Ukraine.  In particular, it was 
General Mossor, the interwar Polish officer, who in early 1947 first advocated resettling the Ukrainians 
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who had escaped the "repatriations."  His reasoning was precisely that since Stalin no longer wanted to 
take Ukrainians, and since the Soviet NKVD was withdrawing from Poland in spring 1947, the Polish 
state must finish the job for itself.  At the time he wrote, about forty percent of the Polish officer corps 
was staffed by Soviet officers, and Soviet officers dominated Polish security forces.  However Mossor's 
opinion was shared by other indisputably Polish officers who took part in the forced resettlement of 
Ukrainians, such as the young Captain Wojciech Jaruzelski.[92] 
  
            Yet an increasing margin for maneuver on the part of the communist regime is a far cry from 
the sovereignty of Poland, and the presence of Poles such as Mossor is a far cry from the legitimacy of 
the Polish government.  A second distinction must therefore be made between "Poland" and the Polish 
communist regime.  The Polish communist party could not have won free elections in postwar Poland.  
(Indeed, the Polish army's attacks on the UPA slowed in winter 1947 because soldiers were busy 
falsifying the results of parliamentary elections.)  Even if the Polish regime enjoyed some margin of 
freedom on Ukrainian policy, it does not follow that policy was "Polish" in the sense of reflecting the 
expressed wishes of a majority of Polish citizens. 
  
            However, a third distinction must be introduced, this time one between kinds of reasoning.  The 
fact that Poles did not choose their regime does not render the ethical question of Polish responsibility 
incoherent.  Not everything undemocratic governments do is unpopular, and the Czechoslovak example 
demonstrates that democratic regimes can be enthusiastic cleansers.  Recall that Eduard Benes, 
president of democratic Czechoslovakia, in 1945 used language very similar to that of the Mossor in 
1947: "we have decided to liquidate the German problem in our republic once and for all."  But 
whereas Benes returned from London after the war to govern Czechoslovakia for more than two years, 
there was no such period of democratic rule in Poland, and so there is no way of knowing what a Polish 
democratic regime would have done.  Although there was general agreement among Polish democrats 
(and communists) to expel the Germans, neither Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Benes's Polish analogue, nor 
the ministries of the Polish government-in-exile, seems to have formulated plans to resolve the 
Ukrainian question.[93]  The main dispute between Mikolajczyk and his rivals was over whether to 
accept Poland's new boundaries, a question which in point of law and from distant London seemed 
more pressing than that of minorities.  Although Polish political thinkers and local political activists 
formulated plans for massive resettlement of Ukrainians, at the highest levels of authority confusion 
rather than desire for revenge was the dominant reaction.   
  
            This requires a fourth and final distinction.  A democratic regime in Poland after the war would 
have been far more sensitive to public opinion than a government-in-exile in distant London trying to 
prosecute a war.  In the context of 1947 the dispersal of Ukrainians was certainly popular policy: "the 
activity of the authorities was in harmony with the attitude of the majority of Poles."
[94]
  To repeat, this 
popular desire for revenge did not in fact bring about the dispersions, since Poles could not choose their 
leaders.  But it did mean that Polish communists, acting on motives of their own, had a strong current 
of opinion to exploit.  It was their goal to create an ethnically pure "national state," but so long as this 
goal continues to resonate with broad sectors of Polish opinion, the question of Polish responsibility 
will have a solid foundation.[95]   
  
            If the best argument for not dismissing the question of Polish responsibility is that Poles might 
well have approved ethnic cleansing in 1947 if asked, then it is quite right to ask why this was the case, 
and impossible not to refer to 1943 in the answer.  Of course, a Ukrainian would not be wrong to then 
point to Polish colonialism during the interwar period, the history of Polish domination of ethnically 
Ukrainian territories, and so on.  There are further arguments and counterarguments.  The distinctions 
presented here provide some contours to the dispute, but they cannot, in the nature of things, prevent it 
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from going full circle, and then round and round again. 
  
  
Six: Memory, History, and NGOs (1989 to the present) 
  
            Good policy can have a much greater immediate effect on such disputes than good 
historiography.  The genius of Polish and Ukrainian policy since the two states regained their 
sovereignty has been to treat these matters within the categories of international politics, rather than in 
the categories of personal memories.  Polish and Ukrainian national memories are not in accord, nor 
indeed are the accounts of leading national historians.  Yet even as disagreements remain about who 
owes whom an apology, and local conflicts over property lost after the Second World War continue, 
relations between the Polish and Ukrainian states are excellent.
[96]
   Poland was the first state to 
recognize Ukraine in 1991, and the two states quickly agreed to a treaty on good relations in 1992.  
Although Polish eastern policy has sometimes disappointed Ukrainians, it has consistently recognized 
Ukraine as an equal sovereign state with the pertinent rights and responsibilities.  Ukraine has come to 
treat Poland as a dependable partner, especially insofar as its foreign policy remains oriented to the 
West.    
  
            If agreement about events of 1943-1947 had been thought a necessary condition for 
rapprochement, Polish-Ukrainian relations would be in a far worse state.[97]   The truth is probably the 
opposite: that improved political relations create the conditions for mutual discussion of diverging 
memories.
[98]
  The priority given to politics over history in the early 1990s, then the achievement of 
political reconciliation in the mid-1990s, cast disagreements about memory in an entirely different light 
by the late 1990s.  Local politicians who recall old grievances have little hope that their gestures will 
force the hands of national authorities, while those national leaders find the way open to grand 
gestures.  Among other achievements, the presidents of sovereign Ukraine and Poland have signed a 
declaration of mutual reconciliation which mentions both the cleansings of Volhynia and Operation 
Wisla.         
  
These successes of state policy were rooted in cooperation among non-governmental 
organizations before the arrival of fully sovereign Polish and Ukrainian states.  Links between the 
Polish Solidarity and Ukrainian Rukh movement assured that historical issues were discussed in private 
before they could become diplomatic problems.  The revision of traditional Polish goals in the east was 
largely the work of the Polish Literary Institute in Paris and its monthly journal Kultura (Culture). 
 Polish and Ukrainian non-governmental organizations collected the primary source material that made 
this report possible, and have generally done so in the name of reconciliation.  Perhaps most striking in 
this regard is the series of conferences on Polish-Ukrainian relations in the 1940s, which began in 1997, 
and are cited as "Trudne pytania" ("Hard questions") throughout this report.  These conferences are 
sponsored by two NGOs, each of which represents people who were ethnically cleansed: a Polish one 
representing Volhynians who were forced to migrate in 1943, and a Ukrainian one representing 
Ukrainians from southeastern Poland who were forced to migrate in 1947.  Although they represent 
quite different views of history, their cooperation reveals a common belief that the full historical record 
is desirable to all concerned.   
  
            This contemporary record is in stark contrast with the almost complete absence of NGOs during 
the actual events.  Neither the partisans nor the states who implemented policies of ethnic cleansing had 
any interest in NGOs monitoring their activities, or in giving aid to their victims.  It is quite striking 
that refugees who did happen across the Red Cross or were aided by the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration  (UNRRA) packets remembered these events very clearly fifty years on.  
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The absence of the NGO sector was perhaps most painfully felt in the creation of a world in which no 
one was neutral.  The experience of ethnic cleansing, and its representation by communist regimes, was 
such as to create the impression of a world of opposing national forces, rather than a world of civil 
societies in which various interests can be legitimately pursued.  One of the accomplishments of NGOs 
in this area in the 1990s has been to return national questions to the spheres of social interests, public 
policy, and academic history. 
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